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Humans discount the value of future rewards over
time. Here we show using functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (fMRI) and neural coupling analyses
that episodic future thinking reduces the rate of delay
discounting through a modulation of neural decision-
making and episodic future thinking networks. In
addition to a standard control condition, real
subject-specific episodic event cues were presented
during a delay discounting task. Spontaneous
episodic imagery during cue processing predicted
how much subjects changed their preferences
toward more future-minded choice behavior. Neural
valuation signals in the anterior cingulate cortex
and functional coupling of this region with hippo-
campus and amygdala predicted the degree to which
future thinking modulated individual preference
functions. A second experiment replicated the
behavioral effects and ruled out alternative explana-
tions such as date-based processing and temporal
focus. The present data reveal a mechanism through
which neural decision-making and prospection
networks can interact to generate future-minded
choice behavior.INTRODUCTION
The consequences of choices are often delayed in time, and in
many cases it pays off to wait. While agents normally prefer
larger over smaller rewards, this situation changeswhen rewards
are associated with costs, such as delays, uncertainties, or effort
requirements. Agents integrate such costs into a value function
in an individual manner. In the hyperbolic model of delay dis-
counting (also referred to as intertemporal choice), for example,
a subject-specific discount parameter accurately describes how
individuals discount delayed rewards in value (Green and Myer-
son, 2004; Mazur, 1987). Although the degree of delay discount-
ing varies considerably between individuals, humans in general
have a particularly pronounced ability to delay gratification,
and many of our choices only pay off after months or even years.
It has been speculated that the capacity for episodic future138 Neuron 66, 138–148, April 15, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.thought (also referred to as mental time travel or prospective
thinking) (Bar, 2009; Schacter et al., 2007; Szpunar et al., 2007)
may underlie the human ability to make choices with high long-
term benefits (Boyer, 2008), yielding higher evolutionary fitness
of our species.
At the neural level, a number of models have been proposed
for intertemporal decision-making in humans. In the so-called
b-d model (McClure et al., 2004, 2007), a limbic system (b) is
thought to place special weight on immediate rewards, whereas
a more cognitive, prefrontal-cortex-based system (d) is more
involved in patient choices. In an alternative model, the values
of both immediate and delayed rewards are thought to be repre-
sented in a unitary system encompassing medial prefrontal
cortex (mPFC), posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and ventral
striatum (VS) (Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Kable and Glimcher,
2010; Peters andBu¨chel, 2009). Finally, in the self-control model,
values are assumed to be represented in structures such as the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) but are subject to top-
downmodulation by prefrontal control regions such as the lateral
PFC (Figner et al., 2010; Hare et al., 2009). Both the b-d model
and the self-control model predict that reduced impulsivity in in-
tertemporal choice, induced for example by episodic future
thought, would involve prefrontal cortex regions implicated in
cognitive control, such as the lateral PFC or the anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC).
Lesion studies, on the other hand, also implicated medial
temporal lobe regions in decision-making and delay discounting.
In rodents, damage to the basolateral amygdala (BLA) increases
delay discounting (Winstanley et al., 2004), effort discounting
(Floresco and Ghods-Sharifi, 2007; Ghods-Sharifi et al., 2009),
and probability discounting (Ghods-Sharifi et al., 2009). Interac-
tions between the ACC and the BLA in particular have been
proposed to regulate behavior in order to allow organisms to
overcome a variety of different decision costs, including delays
(Floresco and Ghods-Sharifi, 2007). In line with these findings,
impairments in decision-making are also observed in humans
with damage to the ACC or amygdala (Bechara et al., 1994,
1999; Manes et al., 2002; Naccache et al., 2005).
Along similar lines, hippocampal damage affects decision-
making. Disadvantageous choice behavior has recently been
documented in patients suffering from amnesia due to hippo-
campal lesions (Gupta et al., 2009), and rats with hippocampal
damage show increased delay discounting (Cheung and
Cardinal, 2005; Mariano et al., 2009; Rawlins et al., 1985). These
observations are of particular interest given that hippocampal
Figure 1. Behavioral Task
During fMRI, subjects made repeated choices
between a fixed immediate reward of 20V and
larger but delayed amounts. In the control condi-
tion, amounts were paired with a waiting time
only, whereas in the episodic condition, amounts
were paired with a waiting time and a subject-
specific verbal episodic tag indicating to the
subjects which event they had planned at the
respective day of reward delivery. Events were
real and collected in a separate testing session
prior to the day of scanning.
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bis et al., 2007). Based on this and a range of other studies, it has
recently been proposed that hippocampus and parahippocam-
pal cortex play a crucial role in the formation of vivid event repre-
sentations, regardless of whether they lie in the past, present, or
future (Schacter and Addis, 2009). The hippocampus may thus
contribute to decision-making through its role in self-projection
into the future (Bar, 2009; Schacter et al., 2007), allowing an
organism to evaluate future payoffs through mental simulation
(Johnson and Redish, 2007; Johnson et al., 2007). Future
thinking may thus affect intertemporal choice through hippo-
campal involvement.
Here we used model-based fMRI, analyses of functional
coupling, and extensive behavioral procedures to investigate
how episodic future thinking affects delay discounting. In Exper-
iment 1, subjects performed a classical delay discounting task
(Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Peters and Bu¨chel, 2009) that
involved a series of choices between smaller immediate and
larger delayed rewards, while brain activity was measured using
fMRI. Critically, we introduced a novel episodic condition that
involved the presentation of episodic cue words (tags) obtained
during an extensive prescan interview, referring to real, subject-
specific future events planned for the respective day of reward
delivery. This design allowed us to assess individual discount
rates separately for the two experimental conditions, allowing
us to investigate neural mechanisms mediating changes in delay
discounting associated with episodic thinking. In a second
behavioral study, we replicated the behavioral effects of Exper-
iment 1 and addressed a number of alternative explanations
for the observed effects of episodic tags on discount rates.
RESULTS
Experiment 1: Prescan Interview
On day 1, healthy young volunteers (n = 30, mean age = 25,
15male) completed a computer-based delay discounting proce-
dure to estimate their individual discount rate (Peters and Bu¨-
chel, 2009). This discount rate was used solely for the purpose
of constructing subject-specific trials for the fMRI session (see
Experimental Procedures). Furthermore, participants compiled
a list of events that they had planned in the next 7 months
(e.g., vacations, weddings, parties, courses, and so forth) andrated them on scales from 1 to 6 with respect to personal rele-
vance, arousal, and valence. For each participant, seven
subject-specific events were selected such that the spacing
between events increased with increasing delay to the episode,
and that events were roughly matched based on personal rele-
vance, arousal, and valence. Multiple regression analysis of
these ratings across the different delays showed no linear effects
(relevance: p = 0.867, arousal: p = 0.120, valence: p = 0.977, see
Figure S1 available online). For each subject, a separate set of
seven delays was computed that was later used as delays in
the control condition. Median and range for the delays used in
each condition are listed in Table S1 (available online). For
each event, a label was selected that would serve as a verbal
tag for the fMRI session.
Experiment 1: fMRI
Behavioral Results
On day 2, volunteers performed two sessions of a delay dis-
counting procedure while fMRI was measured using a 3T
Siemens Scanner with a 32-channel head-coil. In each session,
subjects made a total of 118 choices between 20V available
immediately and larger but delayed amounts. Subjects were
told that one of their choices would be randomly selected and
paid out following scanning, with the respective delay. Critically,
in half the trials, an additional subject-specific episodic tag (see
above, e.g., ‘‘vacation paris’’ or ‘‘birthday john’’) was displayed
based on the prescan interview (see Figure 1) indicating which
event they had planned on the particular day (episodic condi-
tion), whereas in the remaining trials, no episodic tag was pre-
sented (control condition). Amount and waiting time were thus
displayed in both conditions, but only the episodic condition
involved the presentation of an additional subject-specific event
tag. Importantly, nonoverlapping sets of delays were used in the
two conditions. Following scanning, subjects rated for each
episodic tag how often it evoked episodic associations during
scanning (frequency of associations: 1, never; to 6, always)
and how vivid these associations were (vividness of associa-
tions: 1, not vivid at all; to 6, highly vivid; see Figure S1). Addition-
ally, written reports were obtained (see Supplemental Informa-
tion). Multiple regression revealed no significant linear effects
of delay on postscan ratings (frequency: p = 0.224, vividness:
p = 0.770). We averaged the postscan ratings across eventsNeuron 66, 138–148, April 15, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 139
Figure 2. BehavioralData fromExperiment1
Shown are experimentally derived discount func-
tions from the fMRI session for four exemplary
participants (A), correlation with imagery scores
(B), and reaction times (RTs) (C). (A) Hyperbolic
functions were fit to the indifference points sepa-
rately for the control (dashed lines) and episodic
(solid lines, filled circles) conditions, and the
best-fitting k-parameters (discount rates) and R2
values are shown for each subject. The log-trans-
formed difference between discount rates was
taken as a measure of the effect of the episodic
tags on choice preferences. (B) Robust regression
revealed an association between log-differences in
discount rates and imagery scores obtained from
postscan ratings (see text). (C) RTs were signifi-
cantly modulated by option value (main effect
value p < 0.001) with faster responses in trials
with a value of the delayed reward higher than
the 20V reference amount. Note that although
seven delays were used for each condition, some
data points are missing, e.g., only five delay indif-
ference points for the episodic condition are
plotted for sub20. This indicates that, for the two
longest delays, this subject never chose the de-
layed reward. ***p < 0.005. Error bars = SEM.
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score’’ for each subject.
Individual participants’ choice data from the fMRI session
were then analyzed by fitting hyperbolic discount functions to
subject-specific indifference points to obtain discount rates
(k-parameters), separately for the episodic and control condi-
tions (see Experimental Procedures). Subjective preferences
were well-characterized by hyperbolic functions (median R2
episodic condition = 0.81, control condition = 0.85). Discount
functions of four exemplary subjects are shown in Figure 2A.
For both conditions, considerable variability in the discount
rate was observed (median [range] of discount rates: control
condition = 0.014 [0.003–0.19], episodic condition = 0.013
[0.002–0.18]). To account for the skewed distribution of discount
rates, all further analyses were conducted on the log-trans-
formed k-parameters. Across subjects, log-transformed
discount rates were significantly lower in the episodic condition
compared with the control condition (t(29) = 2.27, p = 0.016), indi-
cating that participants’ choice behavior was less impulsive in
the episodic condition. The difference in log-discount rates
between conditions is henceforth referred to as the episodic
tag effect. Fitting hyperbolic functions to the median indifference
points across subjects also showed reduced discounting in the
episodic condition (discount rate control condition = 0.0099,
episodic condition = 0.0077). The size of the tag effect was not
related to the discount rate in the control condition (p = 0.56).
We next hypothesized that the tag effect would be positively
correlated with postscan ratings of episodic thought (imagery
scores, see above). Robust regression revealed an increase
in the size of the tag effect with increasing imagery scores
(t = 2.08, p = 0.023, see Figure 2B), suggesting that the effect
of the tags on preferenceswas stronger themore vividly subjects
imagined the episodes. Examples of written postscan reports140 Neuron 66, 138–148, April 15, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.are provided in the Supplemental Results for participants from
the entire range of imagination ratings. We also correlated the
tag effect with standard neuropsychological measures, the
Sensation Seeking Scale (SSS) V (Beauducel et al., 2003; Zuck-
erman, 1996) and the Behavioral Inhibition Scale/Behavioral
Approach Scale (BIS/BAS) (Carver and White, 1994). The tag
effect was positively correlated with the experience-seeking
subscale of the SSS (p = 0.026) and inversely correlated with
the reward-responsiveness subscale of the BIS/BAS scales
(p < 0.005).
Repeated-measures ANOVA of reaction times (RTs) as a func-
tion of option value (lower, similar, or higher relative to the refer-
ence option; see Experimental Procedures and Figure 2C) did
not show a main effect of condition (p = 0.712) or a condition
3 value interaction (p = 0.220), but revealed a main effect of
value (F(1.8, 53.9) = 16.740, p < 0.001). Post hoc comparisons
revealed faster RTs for higher-valued options relative to similarly
(p = 0.002) or lower valued options (p < 0.001) but no difference
between lower and similarly valued options (p = 0.081).
FMRI Data
FMRI data were modeled using the general linear model (GLM)
as implemented in SPM5. Subjective value of each decision
option was calculated by multiplying the objective amount of
each delayed reward with the discount fraction estimated
behaviorally based on the choices during scanning, and
included as a parametric regressor in the GLM. Note that
discount rates were estimated separately for the control and
episodic conditions (see above and Figure 2), and we thus
used condition-specific k-parameters for calculation of the
subjective value regressor. Additional parametric regressors
for inverse delay-to-reward and absolute reward magnitude,
orthogonalized with respect to subjective value, were included
in the GLM.
Figure 3. Categorical Effect of Episodic
Tags on Brain Activity
Greater activity in lateral parietal cortex (left)
and posterior cingulate/retrosplenial and ventro-
medial prefrontal cortex (right) was observed in
the episodic condition compared with the control
condition. p < 0.05, FWE-corrected for whole-
brain volume.
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We first analyzed differences in the condition regressors without
parametric modulation. Compared to those of the control condi-
tion, BOLD responses to the presentation of the delayed reward
in the episodic condition yielded highly significant activations
(corrected for whole-brain volume) in an extensive network of
brain regions previously implicated in episodic future thinking
(Addis et al., 2007; Schacter et al., 2007; Szpunar et al., 2007)
(see Figure 3 and Table S2), including retrosplenial cortex
(RSC)/ PCC (peak MNI coordinates: 6, 54, 14, peak z value =
6.26), left lateral parietal cortex (LPC, 44, 66, 32, z value =
5.35), and vmPFC (8, 34, 12, z value = 5.50).
Distributed Neural Coding of Subjective Value
We then replicated previous findings (Kable and Glimcher, 2007;
Kable and Glimcher, 2010; Peters and Bu¨chel, 2009) using
a conjunction analysis (Nichols et al., 2005) searching for regions
showing a positive correlation between the height of the BOLD
response and subjective value in the control and episodic condi-
tions in a parametric analysis (Figure 4A and Table S3). Note that
this is a conservative analysis that requires that a given voxel
exceed the statistical threshold in both contrasts separately.
This analysis revealed clusters in the lateral orbitofrontal cortex
(OFC, 36, 50, 10, z value = 4.50) and central OFC (18, 12,
14, z value = 4.05), bilateral VS (right: 10, 8, 0, z value = 4.22;
left: 10, 8, 6, z value = 3.51), mPFC (6, 26, 16, z value =
3.72), and PCC (2, 28, 24, z value = 4.09), representing
subjective (discounted) value in both conditions.
Wenext analyzed the neural tag effect, i.e., regions inwhich the
subjective value correlation was greater for the episodic condi-
tion as compared with the control condition (Figure 4B and
Table S4). This analysis revealed clusters in the left LPC (66,
42, 32, z value = 4.96,), ACC (2, 16, 36, z value = 4.76), left
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC, 38, 36, 36, z value =
4.81), and right amygdala (24, 2, 24, z value = 3.75). Finally,
we performed a triple-conjunction analysis, testing for regions
that were correlated with subjective value in both conditions,
but in which the value correlation increased in the episodic
condition. Only left LPC showed this pattern (66, 42, 30,
z value = 3.55, see Figure 4C and Table S5), the same region
thatwe previously identified as delay-specific in valuation (Peters
and Bu¨chel, 2009). There were no regions in which the subjective
value correlation was greater in the control condition when
compared with the episodic condition at p < 0.001 uncorrected.ACC Valuation Signals and Functional Connectivity
Predict Interindividual Differences in Discount
Function Shifts
We next correlated differences in the neural tag effect with inter-
individual differences in the size of the behavioral tag effect. To
this end, we performed a simple regression analysis in SPM5
on the single-subject contrast images of the neural tag effect
(i.e., subjective value correlation episodic > control) using the
behavioral tag effect [log(kcontrol) – log(kepisodic)] as an explana-
tory variable. This analysis revealed clusters in the bilateral
ACC (right: 18, 34, 18, z value = 3.95, p = 0.021 corrected, left:
20, 34, 20, z value = 3.52, Figure 5, see Table S6 for a complete
list). Coronal sections (Figure 5C) clearly show that both ACC
clusters are located in gray matter of the cingulate sulcus.
Because ACC-limbic interactions have previously been impli-
cated in the control of choice behavior (Floresco and Ghods-
Sharifi, 2007; Roiser et al., 2009), we next analyzed functional
coupling with the right ACC from the above regression contrast
(coordinates 18, 34, 18, see Figure 6A) using a psychophysiolog-
ical interaction analysis (PPI) (Friston et al., 1997). Note that this
analysis was conducted on a separate first-level GLM in which
control and episodic trials were modeled as 10 s miniblocks
(see Experimental Procedures for details). We first identified
regions in which coupling with the ACC changed in the episodic
condition compared with the control condition (see Table S7)
and then performed a simple regression analysis on these
coupling parameters using the behavioral tag effect as an
explanatory variable. The tag effect was associated with
increased coupling between ACC and hippocampus (32,
18, 16, z value = 3.18, p = 0.031 corrected, Figure 6B) and
ACC and left amygdala (26, 4, 26, z value = 2.95, p = 0.051
corrected, Figure 6B, see Table S8 for a complete list of activa-
tions). The same regression analysis in a second PPI with the
seed voxel placed in the contralateral ACC region from the
same regression contrast (20, 34, 22, see above) yielded qual-
itatively similar, though subthreshold, results in these same
structures (hippocampus: 28, 32, 6, z value = 1.96, amyg-
dala: 28, 6, 16, z value = 1.97).
Experiment 2
We conducted an additional behavioral experiment to address
a number of alternative explanations for the observed effects
of tags on choice behavior. First, it could be argued that episodicNeuron 66, 138–148, April 15, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 141
Figure 4. Neural Representation of Subjective Value (Parametric Analysis)
(A) Regions in which the correlation with subjective value (parametric analysis) was significant in both the control and the episodic conditions (conjunction
analysis) included central and lateral orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), bilateral ventral striatum (VS), medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), and posterior cingulate cortex
(PCC), replicating previous studies (Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Peters and Bu¨chel, 2009).
(B) Regions in which the subjective value correlation was greater for the episodic compared with the control condition included lateral parietal cortex (LPC), ante-
rior cingulate cortex (ACC), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), and the right amygdala (Amy).
(C) A conjunction analysis revealed that only LPC activity was positively correlated with subjective value in both conditions, but showed a greater regression slope
in the episodic condition. No regions showed a better correlation with subjective value in the control condition. Error bars = SEM.
All peaks are significant at p < 0.001, uncorrected; (A) and (B) are thresholded at p < 0.001 uncorrected and (C) is thresholded at p < 0.005, uncorrected for display
purposes.
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coming. In Experiment 2, we therefore collected postscan
ratings of reward confidence. Second, it could be argued that
events, always being associated with a particular date, may
have shifted temporal focus from delay-based to more date-
based processing. This would represent a potential confound,
because date-associated rewards are discounted less than
delay-associated rewards (Read et al., 2005). We therefore
now collected postscan ratings of temporal focus (date-based
versus delay-based). Finally, Experiment 1 left open the question
of whether the tag effect depends on the temporal specificity of
the episodic cues. We therefore introduced an additional exper-
imental condition that involved the presentation of subject-
specific temporally unspecific future event cues. These tags
(henceforth referred to as unspecific tags) were obtained by
asking subjects to imagine events that could realistically happen
to them in the next couple of months, but that were not directly
tied to a particular point in time (see Experimental Procedures).142 Neuron 66, 138–148, April 15, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.Episodic Imagery, Not Temporal Specificity,
Reward Confidence, or Temporal Focus, Predicts
the Size of the Tag Effect
In total, data from 16 participants (9 female) are included. Anal-
ysis of pretest ratings confirmed that temporally unspecific and
specific tags were matched in terms of personal relevance,
arousal, valence, and preexisting associations (all p > 0.15).
Choice preferences were again well described by hyperbolic
functions (median R2 control = 0.84, unspecific = 0.81, specific =
0.80). We replicated the parametric tag effect (i.e., increasing
effect of tags on discount rates with increasing posttest imagery
scores) in this independent sample for both temporally specific
(p = 0.047, Figure 7A) and temporally unspecific (p = 0.022,
Figure 7A) tags, showing that the effect depends on future
thinking, rather than being specifically tied to the temporal spec-
ificity of the event cues. Following testing, subjects rated how
certain theywere that a particular rewardwould actually be forth-
coming. Overall, confidence in the payment procedure was high
Figure 5. Correlation between the Neural and Behavioral Tag Effect
(A) Glass brain and (B and C) anatomical projection of the correlation between the neural tag effect (subjective value correlation episodic > control) and the behav-
ioral tag effect (log difference between discount rates) in the bilateral ACC (p = 0.021, FWE-corrected across an anatomical mask of bilateral ACC). (C) Coronal
sections of the same contrast at a liberal threshold of p < 0.01 show that both left and right ACC clusters encompass gray matter of the cingulate gyrus. (D)
Scatter-plot depicting the linear relationship between the neural and the behavioral tag effect in the right ACC. (A) and (B) are thresholded at p < 0.001 with
10 contiguous voxels, whereas (C) is thresholded at p < 0.01 with 10 contiguous voxels.
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subjective certainty estimates (one-way ANOVA: F(2,45) = 0.113,
p = 0.894). Subjects also rated their temporal focus as either
delay-based or date-based (see Experimental Procedures),
i.e., whether they based their decisions on the delay-to-reward
that was actually displayed, or whether they attempted to
convert delays into the corresponding dates and thenmade their
choices based on these dates. There was no overall significant
effect of condition on temporal focus (one-way ANOVA:
F(2,45) = 1.485, p = 0.237, Figure 7C), but a direct comparison
between the control and the temporally specific condition
showed a significant difference (t(15) = 3.18, p = 0.006). We there-
fore correlated the differences in temporal focus ratings between
conditions (control: unspecific and control: specific) with the
respective tag effects (Figure 7D). There were no correlations
(unspecific: p = 0.71, specific: p = 0.94), suggesting that the
observed differences in discounting cannot be attributed to
differences in temporal focus.
High-Imagery, but Not Low-Imagery, Subjects Adjust
Their Discount Function in an Episodic Context
For a final analysis, we pooled the samples of Experiments 1 and
2 (n = 46 subjects in total), using only the temporally specific tag
data from Experiment 2. We performed a median split into low-
and high-imagery participants according to posttest imagery
scores (low-imagery subjects: n = 23 [15/8 Exp1/Exp2], imagery
range = 1.5–3.4, high-imagery subjects: n = 23 [15/8 Exp1/Exp2],
imagery range = 3.5–5). The tag effect was significantly greater
than 0 in the high-imagery group (t(22) = 2.6, p = 0.0085, see
Figure 7D), where subjects reduced their discount rate by onaverage 16% in the presence of episodic tags. In the low-
imagery group, on the other hand, the tag effect was not different
from zero (t(22) = 0.573, p = 0.286), yielding a significant group
difference (t(44) = 2.40, p = 0.011).
DISCUSSION
We investigated the interactions between episodic future
thought and intertemporal decision-making using behavioral
testing and fMRI. Experiment 1 shows that reward delay dis-
counting is modulated by episodic future event cues, and the
extent of this modulation is predicted by the degree of sponta-
neous episodic imagery during decision-making, an effect that
we replicated in Experiment 2 (episodic tag effect). The neuroi-
maging data (Experiment 1) highlight two mechanisms that
support this effect: (1) valuation signals in the lateral ACC and
(2) neural coupling between ACC and hippocampus/amygdala,
both predicting the size of the tag effect.
The size of the tag effect was directly related to posttest
imagery scores, strongly suggesting that future thinking signifi-
cantly contributed to this effect. Pooling subjects across both
experiments revealed that high-imagery subjects reduced their
discount rate by on average 16% in the episodic condition,
whereas low-imagery subjects did not. Experiment 2 addressed
a number of alternative accounts for this effect. First, reward
confidence was comparable for all conditions, arguing against
the possibility that the tags may have somehow altered subjec-
tive certainty that a reward would be forthcoming. Second,
differences in temporal focus between conditions (date-basedFigure 6. Results of the Psychophysiolog-
ical Interaction Analysis
(A) The seed for the psychophysiological interac-
tion (PPI) analysis was placed in the right ACC
(18, 34, 18).
(B) The tag effect was associated with increased
ACC-hippocampal coupling (p = 0.031, corrected
across bilateral hippocampus) and ACC-amyg-
dala coupling (p = 0.051, corrected across bilateral
amygdala). Maps are thresholded at p < 0.005,
uncorrected for display purposes and projected
onto the mean structural scan of all participants;
HC, hippocampus; Amy, Amygdala; rACC, right
anterior cingulate cortex.
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Figure 7. Behavioral Data from Experiment 2
(A) Log-differences in discount rates were positively correlatedwith postscan imagery scores, replicating Experiment 1. This effect was observed both for tempo-
rally unspecific future events (red, p = 0.022) and temporally specific events (black, p = 0.047). One-way ANOVA across conditions revealed no differences in
postscan ratings of reward confidence (B) and temporal focus (C, delay-based versus date-based; see Results section). Furthermore, differences in temporal
focus between control/unspecific and control/specific conditions were not associated with the respective log-differences in discount rates (D), suggesting
that differences in temporal focus are unlikely to underlie the observed differences in discount rates. Median-split analysis (E) pooling data from Exp. 1
and Exp. 2 shows that reduced discounting in the episodic condition occurred in high-imagery subjects (n = 23) but not low-imagery subjects (n = 23). **p = 0.01.
Error bars = SEM.
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against a date-based processing account. Finally, the temporal
specificity of event tags is not a necessary prerequisite for an
effect on choice behavior. Like temporally specific tags, tempo-
rally unspecific tags exerted a comparable, imagery-dependent
influence on choice behavior, supporting the notion that episodic
thought, rather than the temporal specificity that is provided by
events that are linked to a specific point in time, underlies the
observed effects. Nonetheless, similar mechanisms may
underlie the decrease in discounting reported for date-based
processing relative to that of delay-based processing (Read
et al., 2005) and the tag effect. For example, by focusing atten-
tion on the reward outcome rather than the delay, date-based
processing may result in a more vivid reward anticipation,
thereby increasing the subjective value.
We did not obtain postscan imagery ratings of the control
condition, and it is conceivable that some degree of future
thinking may have occurred in the control condition as well.
The observed association of shifts in the value function with
imagery scores nonetheless suggests that, over and above
a possible role of future thought in influencing the rate of dis-
counting in the control condition, this process significantly
modulated the degree to which preferences (and neural activity)
changed in the episodic relative to the control condition. It should
also be noted that discounting can be affected by factors such as
utility, one example being the magnitude effect, reflecting the
fact that low-magnitude rewards are discounted more steeply
than high-magnitude rewards (Green and Myerson, 2004; Green
et al., 1997). In the present experiments, temporally specific and
unspecific tags affected discount functions, but they may do so
by modulating discounting per se (i.e., rewards paired with tags
appear closer in time, thereby increasing the subjective value),
the utility of future rewards, or even the interaction of discounting
and utility. Future studies are necessary to disentangle these
different possibilities.
The robustness of the present fMRI data is indicated by two
important replications. First, we replicated previous findings144 Neuron 66, 138–148, April 15, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.regarding the neural systems coding for subjective value in the
context of intertemporal choice (Kable and Glimcher, 2007;
Kable and Glimcher, 2010; Peters and Bu¨chel, 2009; Pine
et al., 2009). Second, compared with the control condition, the
episodic condition was associated with robust activations in an
extensive network previously implicated in episodic thinking
(Schacter et al., 2007), i.e., LPC, mPFC, and RSC/PCC. Partici-
pants were not instructed to use mental imagery, suggesting
that the evoked associations occurred spontaneously and, as re-
flected in the postscan ratings, with considerable between-
subject heterogeneity. This is in line with postscan debriefings,
where many participants reported that associations were
evoked in a spontaneous and automatic manner. Nonetheless,
in line with previous findings (Peters et al., 2009), spontaneous
associations resulted in a robust recruitment of the same neural
systems involved in effortful elaboration (Addis et al., 2008,
2007). Notably, PCC showed both valuation and categorical
episodic effects. This region contributes to a range of cognitive
phenomena, including memory (Vann et al., 2009), valuation
(Peters and Bu¨chel, 2009), and strategy selection (Pearson
et al., 2009), making a precise functional characterization of
this region difficult.
Turning to the possible neural mechanisms underlying the tag
effect, we observed an upregulation of neural value signals in the
LPC. This was the only region coding for value in both conditions,
but more so in the episodic condition. We have previously found
the same LPC region to code for subjective value specifically in
the context of delay discounting (as opposed to probability dis-
counting) (Peters and Bu¨chel, 2009). These findings are in line
with electrophysiological studies reporting value computations
in neurons in the monkey parietal cortex (Dorris and Glimcher,
2004; Platt and Glimcher, 1999). Nonetheless, for a number of
reasons we believe that this upregulation of value representa-
tions in the LPC is unlikely to underlie the tag effect. It has
recently been suggested that lateral (ventral) parietal cortex
activity may reflect attention to bottom-up activated memory
content (Cabeza et al., 2008) or internal representations in
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likely to also occur when tag-related associations are spontane-
ously evoked in the episodic condition, and the saliency of these
representations may be greater for high-value compared with
low-value options, thus giving rise to the differences in value
regression slopes in the LPC. Such an attentional account of
the LPC data is also in line with the observation that these effects
were not significantly modulated by interindividual differences in
the shift of the discount function, suggesting an all-or-none type
effect. These considerations therefore argue against a causal
role of the LPC in modulating the tag effect.
Second, regions in which value signals were observed in the
episodic, but not the control, condition, included the right amyg-
dala, ACC, and DLPFC. The amygdala involvement may be
related to the positive valence of the events (Sharot et al.,
2007), although this region is traditionally assumed to be more
sensitive to negative affect (Phan et al., 2004). DLPFC and
ACC support various forms of decision-making (Rushworth
and Behrens, 2008; Tanaka et al., 2004) including intertemporal
choice (Figner et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2008; McClure et al., 2004,
2007). Given the role of frontal regions in cognitive control (Miller
and Cohen, 2001), one could speculate that such cognitive oper-
ations are additionally recruited during valuation in the episodic
condition, an interpretation that may be compatible with both
the b-d model and the self-control model. However, some
caution is warranted because the present effects in the DLPFC
and ACC mostly reflect differences in parametric value effects
between conditions, whereas the ‘‘d-areas’’ from the b-d model
(McClure et al., 2004, 2007) and the self-control areas in lateral
PFC (Figner et al., 2010; Hare et al., 2009) have been identified
using categorical fMRI analyses or behavioral data from trans-
cranial magnetic stimulation studies. Our findings do show,
however, that the neural representation of subjective value is
not necessarily confined to mPFC, PCC, and VS, as reported
previously (Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Peters and Bu¨chel,
2009), but can extend to lateral PFC (Camus et al., 2009; Kim
et al., 2008) and ACC in some decision contexts.
Finally, our analyses of individual differences speak directly to
the neural mechanisms mediating the observed shifts in the
delay discount function. Value signals in bilateral ACC predicted
differences in discount rates between conditions. This is in line
with data implicating the ACC in reward-based decision-making,
including adaptive decision-making in which action values
change dynamically (Rushworth and Behrens, 2008; Walton
et al., 2007), choice in settings that require cognitive control
over strong innate behavioral tendencies (De Martino et al.,
2006; Roiser et al., 2009), and decisions involving cost-benefit
computations (Floresco and Ghods-Sharifi, 2007). Also, ACC
activity when people think about their futures self-correlated
with a behavioral measure of delay discounting (Ersner-Hersh-
field et al., 2009). Our data thus suggest that the ACC supports
the flexible adaptation of the value function to changes in deci-
sion context (such as the presence or absence of different
episodic settings), with greater ACC involvement accompanying
greater adjustments in preference functions.
Greater shifts in the discount function were also associated
with increased ACC-hippocampal/amygdala neural coupling,
mirroring the finding of increased ACC-amygdala couplingwhen subjects choose counter to the framing of a decision
option (Roiser et al., 2009). Based on analysis of relatively high
resolution functional images, we suggest that the activation is
located mainly in the BLA. This supports the observation of
BLA involvement (Ghods-Sharifi et al., 2009; Winstanley et al.,
2004) and joint ACC-BLA involvement (Floresco and Ghods-
Sharifi, 2007) in the incorporation of decision costs into choice
behavior. Reciprocal connections between the BLA and mPFC
(Carmichael and Price, 1995; McDonald, 1991; McDonald
et al., 1996) are likely to mediate these functional interactions.
In addition, we also observed increased functional coupling
between ACC and hippocampus with increasing shifts in the
discount function. Hippocampal neurons may modulate medial
prefrontal information processing through unidirectional projec-
tions (Carmichael and Price, 1995; Thierry et al., 2000), which in
some cases jointly target the amygdala andmPFC (Ishikawa and
Nakamura, 2006). These functional prefrontal-hippocampal
interactions are of particular interest in light of a number of recent
findings. Rodents with hippocampal lesions show increased
impulsive choice in delay discounting tasks (Cheung and
Cardinal, 2005; Mariano et al., 2009; Rawlins et al., 1985).
Furthermore, it has been argued that the hippocampus may
support decision-making processes through its role in mentally
simulating potential future outcomes (Johnson et al., 2007),
providing downstream prefrontal regions with a prediction signal
regarding episodic aspects of a decision outcome (Johnson and
Redish, 2007). Enhanced ACC-hippocampal coupling may
therefore reflect the degree to which episodic predictions (Bar,
2009; Schacter et al., 2007) are incorporated into prefrontal deci-
sion-making circuits, and thus predict the degree of shift in the
discount function. In line with these ideas, prefrontal-hippo-
campal interactions were recently implicated in supporting the
incorporation of conceptual information into decision-making
processes (Kumaran et al., 2009).
Psychological accounts of decision-making have been
proposed (Weber and Johnson, 2009), and the tag effect
accords well with such accounts, because it reflects interactions
between prospective cognition and choice. Importantly, our data
support suchpsychological considerations by suggesting aplau-
sible neural mechanism that may mediate such an interaction. In
this view, hippocampal episodic predictions (Schacter and Ad-
dis, 2009) influence preferences and choice through modulating
information processing in prefrontal regions such as the ACC.
To conclude, we describe a behavioral effect in intertemporal
decision-making, namely that episodic tags presented during
a delay discounting procedure reduce impulsive choice through
an induction of episodic imagery. We furthermore show that this
effect is not due to an alteration of reward confidence or temporal
focus, and occurs for both temporally specific and unspecific
event cues. Our fMRI data reveal that incorporating episodic
predictions into choice behavior involves prefrontal and medio-
temporal regions and their interactions. ACC value signals and
functional coupling of the ACCwith hippocampus and amygdala
closely tracked individual adjustments in discount rates in the
presence of episodic tags. Our data thus suggest that the ACC,
based on episodic predictions involving the hippocampus,
supports the dynamic adjustments of preference functions that
enable us to make choices that maximize future payoffs.Neuron 66, 138–148, April 15, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 145
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Experiment 1
Participants
In total, data from 30 subjects (mean age = 25.4 years, 15 male) are included in
the present report. Subjects provided informed written consent, and the study
procedure was approved by the local ethics committee. Six additional
subjects participated but were excluded from analysis, two because of exces-
sive head movement during scanning, one because of equipment failure
during scanning, and three because their discount functions in the fMRI task
were classified as nonsystematic (Johnson and Bickel, 2008), i.e., they either
did not discount by at least 10% of the immediate reward (i.e., 2V) even at the
longest delay (indicating that no discounting occurred), or at least one indiffer-
ence point was greater than the preceding indifference point by a value ofmore
than 20% of the immediate reward (indicating inconsistent preferences).
Prescan Interview and Behavioral Testing
On a separate day prior to scanning, subjects completed an extensive behav-
ioral testing session including a computer-based delay discounting procedure
to estimate the discount rate for a reward of 20V (Peters and Bu¨chel, 2009),
and an extensive prescan interview. In short, indifference amounts were deter-
mined and converted into proportions of the fixed reward. Then, a hyperbolic




(SV, subjective value; D, delay in days; k, discount rate) was fit to these data to
obtain discount parameters (k) using Matlab (The MathWorks, Natick, MA).
During the interview, participants compiled a list of future events that they
had planned, with delays ranging from a few days to around 7 months, and
rated these events on six-point scales for arousal, valence, and personal rele-
vance. For each participant, seven events were then selected such that the
spacing between delays increased with increasing delay, and that events
were roughly matched on valence, arousal, and personal relevance. Only
neutral or positive events were selected. For each event, a verbal label was
selected (episodic tag) that would later be used as a cue stimulus during fMRI.
fMRI Task
The fMRI task was a delay discounting procedure based on a previously used
task (Peters and Bu¨chel, 2009). In short, participants completed two sessions
of 118 trials each. Each trial consisted of the choice between a fixed, imme-
diate reward of 20V and larger but delayed amounts. In half of the trials,
only amount and waiting time were shown (control condition) whereas in the
other half of the trials, a verbal episodic tag (see above) was shown, indicating
to the subjects what event they had planned at the respective day of reward
delivery. Seven distinct delays were calculated for the control condition,
such that no delay appeared in both conditions. Amounts ranged from 20.50
to 80V and were calculated based on the estimated discount rates from the
behavioral pretest.
Participants completed a practice session before scanning that only
involved trials from the control condition. Immediately prior to scanning,
they were told that, for some delays, they had reported planned events in
the prescan interview, whereas for other delays, no events had been
collected. Thus, for some delays, verbal tags would be presented in addition
to the delay, to remind participants what they had planned at the respective
delay. For other delays, no events had been collected in the interview, and
thus no tags would be shown. Thus, participants were not instructed to use
imagery to envision future events. Participants were also told that one of their
choices would be randomly selected following scanning, and that, in the case
of the choice of the immediate reward, they would receive 20V in cash. If the
delayed reward was chosen, the amount was transferred to the participants’
bank account with the respective delay using timed transfers. In addition,
participants received 8V/hr reimbursement for scanning and behavioral
testing.
Immediately after scanning, participants rated for each event the vividness
(not vivid at all. highly vivid) and the frequency (never. always) of associa-
tions spontaneously evoked by the event tags on six-point scales. Also, written
reports were obtained in which participants provided details of feelings or
thoughts evoked by each of the episodic tags.146 Neuron 66, 138–148, April 15, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.fMRI Data Acquisition
MRI data were acquired on a 3T system (Siemens TIM-TRIO) using a
32-channel head-coil. Seven-hundred volumes, aligned to the line connecting
anterior and posterior commissures, were acquired for each session, and
the first five volumes were discarded to allow the BOLD signal to stabilize.
Each volume comprised 40 slices with a voxel size of 2 3 2 3 2 mm and
1 mm gap (TR = 2.38 s, TE = 25 ms). An additional MPRAGE structural image
was acquired for anatomical overlay (voxel size 1 3 1 3 1 mm, 240 slices).
Subjects viewed the experiment through a head-coil-mounted mirror.
fMRI Data Analysis
Data preprocessing and analysis was performed using SPM5 (Wellcome
Department of Cognitive Neurology, University College London). Functional
images were slice-time corrected to the onset of the middle slice and spatially
realigned using a 6-parameter affine transformation and unwarped to account
for effects of subject movement. The high-resolution T1 image was then cor-
egistered to the functional images and segmented into gray matter, white
matter, and cerebrospinal fluid using the voxel-based morphometry toolbox
included in SPM5. Functional images were spatially normalized to MNI space
using the normalization parameters obtained from the segmentation proce-
dure, and subsequently smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 8 mm full-width
at half-maximum.
Data analysis was performed using the GLM implemented in SPM5. The
presentation of each type of option (control or episodic) was modeled by
convolving the event-train of stimulus onsets with the canonical heamody-
namic response function (HRF) separately for each session. Error trials and
button presses were modeled separately. Subjective value of each decision
option was calculated by multiplying the absolute amount of the reward
with the empirically derived discount fraction (based on the choices during
fMRI and separately for control and episodic trials, i.e., condition-specific
k-parameters from the scanning session were used for the calculation of
subjective value) and included as a parametric regressor in the GLM. Addi-
tional parametric regressors coding for the absolute amount of the reward
and inverse delay-to-reward were included in the model and orthogonalized
with respect to subjective value (Peters and Bu¨chel, 2009). For each subject,
contrast images coding for the condition onset (control/episodic) and for
the subjective value regressor were constructed. These contrast images
were then entered into a second-level random effects analysis using correc-
tion for nonsphericity in the context of the flexible factorial design as imple-
mented in SPM5. The model included a subject factor and the factor trial
type (control/episodic).
For the analysis of individual differences, the contrast images from the
comparison of subjective value correlations between the episodic and control
conditions (value correlation episodic > control) were entered into a simple
regression in SPM5 using the behavioral tag effect as an explanatory variable.
The PPI analysis involved in a first step the construction of an addition model
at the first level. Control and episodic trials were modeled asminiblocks of 10 s
length. From this model, the time courses from the ACC peak voxels identified
in the analysis of individual differences (right ACC: 18, 34, 18; left ACC: 20,
34, 22) were extracted and an additional condition regressor coding 1 for
episodic trials and 1 for control trials was created. The ACC time course,
the condition regressor, and the interaction term (the PPI regressor) were
then entered into an additional first level model for each subject. The contrast
images of the interaction regressor were analyzed at the second level using
a one-sample t test and in a simple regression using the behavioral tag effect
as an explanatory variable.
For all analyses, the threshold was set to p < 0.05 corrected for multiple
comparisons using the family-wise error rate. For the subjective value conjunc-
tion analysis (control + episodic), correction for multiple comparisons was for
10 mm spheres centered at activation peaks derived from independent data,
i.e., previous studies (Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Peters and Bu¨chel, 2009). For
the LPC activation from the triple conjunction (subjective value correlation
control + episodic + [episodic > control]), correction was based on a 4 mm
sphere on the delay-specific LPC peak identified previously (Peters and
Bu¨chel, 2009). Correction for the hippocampus, amygdala, and ACCwere per-
formed using bilateral anatomical masks (Maldjian et al., 2003). For display
purposes, all maps are thresholded at p < 0.001, uncorrected, with at least
10 contiguous voxels, unless stated otherwise.
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Participants
Data from 16 participants (7 male) are included. Subjects provided informed
written consent and the study procedure was approved by the local ethics
committee. Three additional subjects participated but were excluded from
data analysis: one because she never chose an immediate reward, indicating
no discounting occurred; one because of misunderstanding instructions; and
one because she showed a tag effect that was more than 4 standard devia-
tions above the group mean.
Pretest Interview and Behavioral Testing
The same procedures as in Experiment 1 were applied (e.g., pretest interview
on day 1, behavioral testing on day 2) with the following additions/exceptions.
In addition to collecting real future events, participants were now also asked to
compile a list of events that could realistically happen to them in the next
couple of months, but that were not tied to a particular date. For both the
temporally specific and temporally unspecific condition, five events (rather
than seven, as in Experiment 1) were selected. In addition to valence, arousal,
and personal relevance, subjects now also rated for each event how many
associations (such as people, places, activities, etc.) spontaneously came to
mind when thinking of the event.
Behavioral Procedure
The task and payment procedures were the same as in Experiment 1, with the
following exceptions. Subjects now completed three sessions of 75 trials each
(yielding a total of 75 trials per condition, i.e., control, temporally specific, and
temporally unspecific). Control trials, specific trials, and unspecific trials were
randomly interspersed with the constraint that no more than three trials of the
same type were presented consecutively. Furthermore, the random jitters
between events (see Experiment 1) required for fMRI analysis were removed
from the experiment. Specific and unspecific tags were shown with blue and
light blue backgrounds to make these different categories of tags visually
distinct. In addition to the posttest ratings collected in Experiment 1, subjects
now rated for each event and each delay from the control condition (1) their
confidence in the payment scheme on a scale from 1 to 6 and (2) whether their
temporal focus was on the displayed delay, or whether they converted the
delay into the corresponding date and based their decision on this date.
This was also rated on a scale from 1 (always date-based decision) to 6 (always
delay-based decision).SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information for this article includes one figure and eight tables
and can be found with this article online at doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2010.03.026.
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